INTRODUCTION
Presumptions have played a decisive role in child custody determinations. This article aims to place these presumptions in historical context as well as setting out their current scope and policy rationales, particularly in light of the current debate over joint custody presumptions and other Courts dealing with marital dissolution were primarily concerned with the allocation of material goods, and child custody doctrines evolved as a subset of property rights. 4 Colonial Americans adapted these traditions to include a quid pro quo between father and child. 5 The male parent retained a right to the physical custody, labor, and earnings of his children in exchange for the duty to support, educate, and train them to earn their own livelihoods. Since custody was originally incident to guardianship of lands, the father was seen as the natural guardian of the child. Thus, in virtually all cases, common law courts awarded sole custodial rights to the father, unless the court had determined the father to be an unfit parent. Colonial mothers, though deemed worthy of honor and deference, were not endowed with natural or legally enforceable parental rights and responsibilities.
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, English courts invoked the doctrine of parens patriae to sidestep paternal supremacy and further the welfare of children. Although a father's custodial right remained paramount, judges became more willing to balance a mother's childrearing capabilities against a father's superior economic and political standing. These equitable, less formalized familial notions took root in American courts, altering the concept of children as property and legitimating the parental role of women. While nineteenth-century American courts acknowledged the common law rule, they were confronted with two related cultural shifts: the industrial revolution's remaking men into marketplace wage earners and the emergence of a "separate sphere" for women as domestic caregivers. 6 Mothers were seen as the instinctive custodians for both young children and those with disabilities. In following these dictates, courts crafted a "tender years" doctrine that allocated custody of young children to their mothers upon divorce or separation. A mother was "God's own institution for the rearing and upbringing of the child," and thus maternal custody placed "child culture in the hands of an expert." 7 The nineteenth-century cult of domesticity extolled wifely virtues and elevated mother love to near-mythic heights. In the courts, paternal supremacy gave way to an almost reflexive and routine application of the tender years doctrine. Progressive Era legislation fortified the role of the state as parens patriae, increasing the power of judges to evaluate parental fitness, and thereby further undercutting absolute male authority within the household.
It took a social revolution to unseat the tender years doctrine and replace it with gender-neutral custody standards. Mounting divorce rates in the 1960s and ensuing decades provoked a lively debate about custody issues and parental roles. The movement for gender equality, along with the rise of father's rights groups, called attention to the importance of both parents in the care and nurturance of children, as well as a loosening of the link between gender and parental role. 8 Meanwhile, the demise of the tender years doctrine left courts without a presumption to direct their custody deliberations. In lieu of gender-based theories, judges substituted the more inclusive but less definitive best interests standard. Unwittingly, courts succeeded in burdening themselves with case-by-case custody determinations, often involving a battle of experts, in lengthy and hotly contested custody litigation. What is more, the best interests standard seemed to many to engender a risk of excessive judicial discretion as well as a threat of inconsistency and subjectivity on the part of judges.
Courts in the 1970s began to realize that "the assumption a mother keeps the home, performs household duties, and will have more time to devote to the children and their welfare" was simply not true for many mothers.
9 Gendered doctrines also yielded in the face of an emerging belief that "what a child needs is not a mother, but someone who can provide 'mothering.' " 10 Despite the nearly universal abolition of a formal tender years presumption, however, "some judges [retain] a tendency to prefer that custody of young children be placed in the mother."
11 Even courts articulating the best interests standard often hewed to the unwritten presumption "that the interests of children of tender years will be best served when they are in the custody of their mother." 12 A relic of the common law, it seems that the tender years doctrine is forgotten but not gone.
To varying degrees, states continue to weigh the primary caretaker's role in child rearing as a factor in making custody determinations. Some states have a presumption in favor of the "primary caretaker,"
13 while others have eliminated it. 14 The primary caretaker presumption, while gender-neutral on its face, is broadly seen as achieving the same maternal preference results as the tender years doctrine. 15 In many states, identifying the child's primary caregiver is a factor in the court's custody determination, but it is not entitled to presumptive weight.
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FROM THE RULE OF ONE TO THE SHARING OF CUSTODY
Both the paternal preference rule at common law and the tender years doctrine that supplanted it in the 19 th century signaled the law's conviction that custody was indivisible: after a marital breakup, children could properly be raised by only one parent, with the other parent entitled only to visitation. Illustrating this rule of one is a 1913 Arizona custody statute providing that "other things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it shall be given to the mother. If the child is of an age requiring education and preparation for labor or business, then to the father."
17 Except in extreme cases, these legal conventions also avoided judicial evaluation of the welfare of the children whose custody was being determined. Unless the child would be placed in serious jeopardy through an award of custody to the legally favored parent, the paradigmatic custody rules at play until the late 20 th century allowed the courts to determine the result relatively easily by reference to broad legal norms. As the Alabama Supreme Court observed, courts throughout the country traveled "full circle in resolving the difficult questions surrounding child custody. At common law, courts spoke of the natural rights of the father. Now they speak of the instinctive role of the mother." 18 In either case, the best interests of the child were assumed, not investigated.
Until the 1970s, courts regularly refused to order the sharing of custody between divorcing parents. As the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in 1934, the traditional objection to joint custody was that it "divided the control of the child, which is to be avoided, whenever possible, as an evil fruitful in the destruction of discipline, in the creation of distrust, and in the production of mental distress in the child." 19 The dominant view was that a child needed the stability of a single home run by only one parent, and that shifting the child from parent to parent would result in "a permanent injury to the child" by "constantly remind[ing him] that he is the center of a parental quarrel," and would not be "conducive to good citizenship." 20 Joint custody arrangements were nearly incomprehensible to most courts: "it is hardly possible for a child to grow up and live a normal, happy life under such circumstances." 21 The greater social and legal acceptance of joint custody in the 1970s came about when "parents began assuming more equal parenting responsibilities and [because] it served to avoid the 'win-lose' mentality of child custody disputes." 22 In 1975, only North Carolina had a statute allowing for joint custody. 23 Within a decade, thirty states had adopted similar laws. 24 At the same time, courts in greater numbers began authorizing joint custody even without express statutory mandate, in light of the "[s]ignificant societal changes" in late twentieth-century America. 25 These courts saw in joint custody an opportunity for a child to continue a strong and meaningful relationship with both parents, avoiding the treatment of one parent as merely a "visitor" to the child and possibly alleviating the trauma the child experienced in the marital dissolution.
In the 1980s, the drive for gender equality in child custody practices dovetailed with efforts to mitigate the adversarial nature of divorce and family law proceedings. California, already a leader in promoting no-fault divorce and conciliation in domestic disputes, became the first state to legislate a preference for joint legal and physical custody. By 2013, thirty-six states have authorized joint custody, either by presumption, preference, or by adopting statutory language in support of cooperative parenting. 26 The terminology of custody law changed to incorporate notions of "shared parenting" and "parenting plans" in place of the more rigid and proprietary "custody" and "visitation." As a matter of public policy, the phrase "frequent and continuing contact with both parents" appears in most state statutes with nearly mechanical regularity.
The risk inherent in a joint custodial arrangement is the creation of "confusion and instability for children at the very time they need a sense of certainty and finality in their lives," particularly if the parents are not committed to the substantial collaboration and communication required for the success of joint custody. 27 Most courts and commentators agree with the oft-quoted dictum of the New York Court of Appeals that "joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion," while "[a]s a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos."
28
In the frequent situation in which both parents are employed, joint custody can facilitate a more equitable sharing of the responsibilities of child rearing. But while the gender divide has narrowed in recent decades, it remains stubbornly real. A 2013 Pew Research Center study reports that "the time mothers spend on housework and child care is still about twice that of fathers." 29 Paid work, child care, and housework are not evenly distributed:
Overall, fathers spend significantly more hours each week in paid work than do mothers (40 hours vs. 23 hours, on average), while mothers' time in unpaid work (child care and housework) is much longer than that of fathers (31 hours per week vs. 17 hours).
30
Depending on the family's circumstances, employment of both parents outside the home can make shared parenting after separation either a curse or a blessing.
JOINT CUSTODY PRESUMPTIONS AND PREFERENCES TODAY
As the Think Tank Final Report notes, " [t] he most significant trend in contemporary child custody law is toward greater active involvement by both parents in continued child rearing after separation."
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This area is abuzz with legislative activity. Child custody statutes are frequently amended and bills regularly introduced calling for more changes. As one Canadian commentator noted, " [f] ollowing what has become an international common law trend identified in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Canadian custody and access decision making has become increasingly focused on maintaining parent/child access." 32 New Zealand law has a similar focus.
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The applicability, appropriateness, and even the definition of joint custody are in a state of fluctuation. The term itself is often used rather loosely and confusingly in both popular journals and professional publications, including statutes and judicial opinions throughout the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. As the Maryland Court of Appeals once complained, " [t] he inability of courts and commentators to agree on what is meant by the term 'joint custody' makes difficult the task of distilling principles and guidelines from a rapidly growing body of literature and case law. What one writer sees as an amorphous concept another sees as a structured legal arrangement."
(A) THE CHILD CUSTODY CONTINUUM
In all states and many countries, the child's best interest is the paramount consideration in a custody determination. 35 Nearly every state has established guidelines for determining the best interest of the child. Most have a fairly comprehensive set of statutory factors. 36 In some states, case law has substantially expanded the general directions provided by the legislature. 37 But there is no consensus as to the exact relationship between a determination regarding the best interests of the child and the ultimate determination regarding joint custody. In other words, there is no clear way to assign weight or value to individual best interest factors in an effort to calculate whether an award of joint custody will be assigned. As the Practice Commentaries to New York's custody statute suggest, "Since the court should always strive to do what is best for the child, the best interest of the child standard does not, on its own, offer much real guidance." 38 Typically, a state's custody statute will list a number of factors for the court to assess, but will not prioritize these factors. 39 The same multi-factor but open-ended analysis attends to child custody standards developed via case law.
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Many states and several countries have established either a statutory presumption in favor of joint custody or a policy preferring joint custody to sole custody. Behind these presumptions or preferences in favor of joint legal custody stands the public policy of assuring that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in their best interests, and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their children after divorce or separation.
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A number of scenarios have been swept under the joint custody umbrella: that both parents have legal custody (decision-making) but only one parent has physical custody (residence); that the parents share both legal and physical custody in approximately equal proportions; and that the parents share legal custody but one parent predominates in the residential placement of their child. This last scenario resembles the traditional sole custody award to one parent with visitation rights to the other. Even decreeing that physical custody will be equally shared opens the door to other questions: will the child spend alternate days (or weeks or fortnights or longer set periods) with each parent; will the child live with one parent on weekend and holidays while residing during school days with the other; or-a rare option-will the child live in the family home while each parent takes turns residing in it?
In light of these permutations, the joint custody-sole custody distinction is best viewed along a continuum, not as a sharp divide. Most states distinguish between joint legal and joint physical custody, allocating to the former the authority of both parents to participate equally in making significant long-term decisions regarding their child's health, education, and welfare. Joint physical custody implies that the child is in the physical care of both parents. But there is no accepted formula for how many hours per week, month, or year the child must reside with each parent for the arrangement to qualify as joint physical custody.
For example, Arizona's 2013 statute termed legal custody "legal decision-making," and defined it as "the legal right and responsibility to make all nonemergency legal decisions for a child including those regarding education, health care, religious training and personal care decisions." 42 In lieu of physical custody, the lawmakers defined "parenting time" to mean "the schedule of time during which each parent has access to a child at specified times." 43 The court may order either sole or joint legal decision-making according to the best interests of the child. A parent who is not granted sole or joint legal decision-making must be afforded meaningful and continuing contact with the child unless the court finds such contact to be mentally, physically, morally or emotionally detrimental to the child. 44 In determining the best interests of the child with regard to legal decisionmaking and parenting time, the court must consider all relevant factors, including the ten specific ones detailed in the statute. 45 Further, in ascertaining the level of decision making that is in the child's best interests, the court must weigh an additional four statutory factors. 46 But no formulas or minimum/maximum time periods are specified for the calculation of the appropriate duration or frequency of parenting time.
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutory provisions authorizing courts to award joint custody in one form or another (legal or physical). 47 The remaining three states permit these orders through case law. 48 A number of states have joint custody presumptions or preferences, while others have avoided either term and have instead directed that the courts order as much parenting time with each parent as is reasonably possible. 49 The terminological vagaries make it strikingly difficult to fairly categorize these statutes, and any effort to assess their impact on family life based upon the statutory language alone would be foolhardy. All states continue to frame the custody resolution norm in terms of the best interests of the child, and therefore presumptions, preferences, and the other legal terms are subservient to that hallmark custody standard.
Statutory snapshots from Iowa and Arkansas illustrate the difficulties of generalizing in this area. Iowa's statute ostensibly lacks a custody presumption, noting only that the court "may" provide for joint custody. But the statute also insists that the court "shall" make a custody awardwhich will assure the child the opportunity for the maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved the marriage, and which will encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of raising the child unless direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the child, other children, or a parent is likely to result from such contact with one parent.
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This legislative drafting avoids the idiom of presumptions, but in its inclusive and sweeping language ("maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents . . . which will encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of raising the child . . .") it expresses a mandate for postseparation joint parenting to as great a degree as possible.
In 2013, Arkansas amended its child custody laws to indicate that joint custody is "favored" and defining it as "the approximate and reasonable equal division of time with the child by both parents individually as agreed to by the parents or as ordered by the court."
51 Whether "favored" will be interpreted as a presumption, a preference, or simply a general expression of public policy supportive of an increased role for the noncustodial parent remains to be seen. Initially, it seems most likely that the measure was intended to overrule the state judiciary's long-standing rule that joint custody was "disfavored."
(B) CONSULTATION AND COLLABORATION VS. THE ONE-PARENT VETO
The emphasis on mutual consultation and collaboration has led courts to refuse to sanction joint custody when parental cooperation and communication are lacking. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a lower court finding that "because the parents were unable to communicate face-to-face and because there is a level of distrust between the parents, joint decision making by the parents was not in the child's best interests." 53 This principle is abundantly established in case law. 54 But some states specifically do not allow a parent to employ a unilateral veto on joint custody. The Missouri legislature has determined that "joint physical and joint legal custody . . . shall not be denied solely for the reason that one parent opposes a joint physical and joint legal custody award." 55 Similarly, an Alabama statute provides that a court "may order a form of joint custody without the consent of both parents, when it is in the best interest of the child." 56 A Louisiana statute establishes a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the children, and a parent who objects to joint custody bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. 57 While these conflicting signals may be reconciled as consistent with the best interests principle, the difficulties in application of multiple and ambiguous standards continue to cloud the issue.
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Rebutting the joint custody presumption involves more than merely showing disagreement. Courts have often looked beyond parental disharmony to order joint custody when in the child's best interests. The general rule is that mutual hostility will not doom a joint custody arrangement if the parents are able "to set aside their personal feelings for the best interest of the children when required." 59 Obviously, each case draws upon its own factual context when the two essential components of successful shared parenting are assessed: "One is a strong commitment to cooperate. The other is a capacity to engage in the cooperation required."
(C) JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY/DECISION-MAKING PREFERENCES
Some states have articulated a preference-not a presumption-for joint legal custody through their statutory schemes, legislative policy declarations, or case law. 61 These expressed preferences require courts to keep joint legal custody "on the table" and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of rearing their children. Sometimes the language is mildly hortatory: "The court shall assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents, when appropriate, and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of rearing their children." 62 At other times, the preference is stated directly ("Joint legal custody is preferred" 63 ), but conditioned by the commonsense necessity that parents can "cooperate and communicate." 64 Kansas's custody statute mandates a preference for joint custody by listing joint custody ahead of sole legal custody "in the order of preference."
65 By contrast, Georgia has enacted a statutory preference in favor of joint custody that is less directly expressed but so understood in the case law. The Georgia custody statute begins by disavowing any presumption "in favor of any particular form of custody, legal or physical."
66 But a subsequent provision sets out "the express policy of this state to encourage that a child has continuing contact with parents . . . and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their child after such parents have separated . . ." 67 The Georgia Supreme Court has held that enforcing the legislative policy favoring shared rights and responsibilities between parents requires the trial court to give "'due consideration' to the feasibility of a joint custody arrangement."
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Many states have no presumption or preference with regard to joint legal custody. Hawaii's statutory scheme lays out the issue in neutral terms, directing the court that it should award custody to either or both parents according to the child's best interests standard, and that it "also may consider frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact of each parent with the child unless the court finds that a parent is unable to act in the best interest of the child. . . ." 69 A recent Arizona statute evenhandedly states that the court "may order sole legal decision-making or joint legal decisionmaking."
70 But in "determining the level of decision-making that is in the child's best interests," the court must consider the eleven factors prescribed for the initial legal decision-making allocation, as well as four additional factors.
71 Although Arizona's statute expresses no presumption or preference for joint legal custody, it requires the court, "[c]onsistent with the child's best interests," to "adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time."
72 The legislative goal of ensuring that both parties retain their parenting roles as much as possible post dissolution is also apparent in the provision that a "parent who is not granted sole or joint legal decision-making is entitled to reasonable parenting time to ensure that the minor child has substantial, frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with the parent." 73 Finally, some states have an explicit preference against joint legal custody. 74 Other states make it clear that, absent complete accord between the parents, trial judges are forbidden to allocate decisionmaking responsibility jointly. 75 Courts also view parental pledges of forthcoming good behavior in the light of judicial experience with the conflicts experienced by many divorcing couples. As an Illinois appellate court stated, "we view joint custody as most extraordinary and counsel skepticism when trial courts hear promises from newly divorcing parents that they can surmount the manifest difficulties of a joint-custody order."
(D) JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY/PARENTING TIME DETERMINATIONS
A generation ago, New York's highest court announced its perspective on joint physical custody in what has come to be known as the "Braiman rule." 77 The court asserted that "alternating physical custody" would generally "further the insecurity and resultant pain frequently experienced by the young victims of shattered families." Thus, the court viewed joint custody as "a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion." But the court warned that as "a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and wrongs, [joint custody] can only enhance familial chaos."
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Although this assessment dates from 1978, New York and other courts still consider those same "relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion" 79 to be the gold standard for participants in joint custody. The other half of the Braiman rule has also continued in force as the well-established principle "that joint custody is not appropriate where the parties are antagonistic toward each other and have demonstrated an inability to cooperate in matters concerning the child, even if the parties have agreed to the joint custody arrangement."
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In contrast to the major decision-making components at the heart of legal custody, physical custody generally means "the right and obligation to provide a home for the child and to make the day-to-day decisions required during the time the child is actually with the parent having such custody."
81 When physical custody is entrusted to the parents jointly, it is generally "divided" custody, as each parent normally has a separate residence to which the child travels. 82 Divided physical custody will rarely be equally divided, and "most commonly will involve custody by one parent during the school year and by the other during summer vacation months, or division between weekdays and weekends, or between days and nights."
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Nor should an award of joint legal custody be seen as the prologue to joint physical custody. In the words of the recently-enacted Arizona statute, "[s]hared legal decision-making does not necessarily mean equal parenting time."
84 Logistical and other practical reasons generally lead to the far greater frequency of joint legal than joint physical custody awards, especially if the latter involves a 50/50 split of the children's time between the parents.
(E) TEMPORAL FORMULAS FOR PARENTING TIME?
Most often, as in Missouri's statute, a joint custody order awards "each of the parents significant, but not necessarily equal, periods of time during which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision of each of the parents." 86 The Missouri law tracks the modern trend defining joint physical custody as a mechanism for ensuring "frequent, continuing and meaningful contact" between the child and both parents. 87 Similarly, the Massachusetts statute provides that a child should have "periods of residing with and being under the supervision of each parent" with the usual proviso "that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure a child frequent and continued contact with both parents."
88 In Tennessee, the court must decree "a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child" consistent with a bevy of factors, including ten specified criteria pertaining to the best interests determination, as well as "the location of the residences of the parents, the child's need for stability and all other relevant factors."
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Even where the legislature has created a statutory presumption in favor of joint physical custody, judges retain wide discretion on how to allocate parenting time. For example, California law contains a presumption in favor of "joint custody," a term which encompasses both joint legal and physical custody, when both parties agree. 90 But the presumption is subject to the statutory multi-factor best interests analysis. 91 And joint physical custody "means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody," and is to be "shared by the parents in such a way so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents . . ." 92 Idaho law similarly includes a presumption that joint custody, both legal and physical, is in the best interests of the child "absent a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary."
93 But the legislature made it clear that its focus was not parental equality but rather ensuring "significant periods of time in which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision of each of the parents. . . ." 94 The legislative instructions equip the courts with broad discretion to craft the actual arrangements, adding the caution that joint physical custody "does not necessarily mean the child's time with each parent should be exactly the same in length nor does it necessarily mean the child should be alternating back and forth over certain periods of time between each parent." 95 Statutory terms directing that parenting time be allocated equally are often interpreted by the courts to mean less than the words suggest. For example, Louisiana's statute provides that " [t] o the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody of the children should be shared equally."
96 But the state's appellate courts have held that, despite the "shared equally" language in the statute, "[s]ubstantial time rather than strict equality of time is mandated by the legislative scheme providing for joint custody of children."
97 Substantial rather than literal equality is also at the heart of Georgia's statute, which defines joint physical custody to mean "that physical custody is shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child of substantially equal time and contact with both parents." 98 While most states have eschewed temporal formulas, several have mandated specific residential custody percentages under certain circumstances. In interpreting state statutes calling for "frequent associations and a continuing relationship with both parents" after separation or divorce, 99 the Nevada Supreme Court has determined that joint custody means that each parent must have physical custody of the child at least 40 percent of the time, or 146 days per year." 100 Utah law defines joint physical custody to mean "the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year."
101 The Utah Legislature has also enacted a series of guidelines intended "to promote parent-time at a level consistent with all parties' interests."
102 These include a minimum parent-time schedule for children aged 5 to 18 years and one for children under 5 years old."
103 An order of parent-time conforming to the statutory guidelines is "presumed to be in the best interests of the child" unless "a parent can establish . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent-time should be awarded under statutory criteria." 104 Minnesota law incorporates a "rebuttable presumption that a parent is entitled to receive at least 25 percent of the parenting time for the child."
105 Calculating what this formula means in the life of a child is not an easy task. The statute provides a method for determining 25 percent of parenting time that allows for alternative counting measures and implies that a strict computation may at times be impracticable:
[T]he percentage of parenting time may be determined by calculating the number of overnights that a child spends with a parent or by using a method other than overnights if the parent has significant time periods on separate days when the child is in the parent's physical custody but does not stay overnight. The court may consider the age of the child in determining whether a child is with a parent for a significant period of time.
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West Virginia's approach to joint custody is unusual in that the state has adopted the "approximation" approach to shared parenting proposed by the American Law Institute in its Principles of Family Dissolution. 107 The statute provides that " [u] nless otherwise resolved by agreement of the parents . . . or unless manifestly harmful to the child, the court shall allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents' separation or, if the parents never lived together, before the filing of the action. . . ."
108 The statute subjects the approximation rule to a best interests standard with eight specific factors, allowing the court to deviate from the approximation rule as appropriate.
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In Texas, if the court appoints the parents as "joint managing conservators" of the child, it must "designate the conservator who has the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the child. . . ."
110 But the court must also "specify the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's physical care, support, and education" and "allocate between the parents, independently, jointly, or exclusively, all of the remaining rights and duties of a parent. . . ."
111 The Texas Family Code provides, however, that " [t] he best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child."
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THE UNCLEAR LEGAL EFFECT OF JOINT CUSTODY PRESUMPTIONS
What does a joint physical custody presumption actually mean? Generally, it aims at ensuring frequent and continuing parent-child contact with no specific sharing formula. Idaho's provision is typical-a statutory presumption that joint custody (both legal and physical) is in the child's best interests. 113 The statute emphasizes that joint physical custody "does not necessarily mean the child's time with each parent should be exactly the same in length nor does it necessarily mean the child should be alternating back and forth over certain periods of time between each parent." 114 Trial courts retain a great deal of discretion, particularly since the statute commands them to determine "[t]he actual amount of time with each parent. . . ."
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The California Legislature has decreed it a matter of public policy to assure children of substantial contact with both parents post-dissolution and to promote shared parenting unless it would be contrary to the child's best interests.
116 California statutes contain a presumption that joint custody (both legal and physical) is in the best interests of the child when the parents have agreed to it.
117 Joint physical custody means "that each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody" and it "shall be shared by the parents in such a way so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents. . . ."
118 The statute does not provide any temporal determinants or formulas to assess whether the presumption is being properly applied.
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Joint custody presumptions in several states are triggered by parental agreement. 120 For example, the Tennessee statute indicates that when parents agree to joint custody, a contrary finding by the court requires "clear and convincing evidence to the contrary."
121 This burden shifting is typical, since the presumption is often phrased in terms of the allocation of the burden of proof. 122 The degree of difficulty in carrying this burden depends on the court's view of the evidence suggesting the likelihood of continued parental agreement. Tennessee's courts have interpreted this to mean that joint custody arrangements are appropriate only where a "harmonious and cooperative relationship" exists between both parents. 123 Tennessee's traditional hostility to joint custody is glaringly apparent: "While we have stopped short of rejecting this type of custody arrangement outright, divided or split [i.e., joint] custody should only be ordered when there is specific, direct proof that the child's interest will be served best by dividing custody between the parents." 124 West Virginia offers a different condition precedent to a presumption in favor of joint decisionmaking. The West Virginia statute holds that if each of the child's parents has been "exercising a reasonable share of parenting functions for the child, the court shall presume" that joint legal custody is in the child's best interests. 125 As with other joint custody presumptions, it can be rebutted if there is a history of domestic abuse or by a showing that joint allocation of decision-making responsibility is not in the child's best interest.
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Nebraska courts may award "joint physical custody or joint legal custody, or both . . . regardless of any parental agreement or consent." 127 The court is authorized to override the wishes of either or both parents as long as it makes the specific finding that the award is in the best interests of the child after a hearing in open court.
128 These provisions were added by the state legislature in 1993 to overrule a state supreme court decision that required the agreement of both parents in order to award joint custody.
129 However, Nebraska appellate courts continue to insist upon "the longstanding rule that joint custody is not favored by the courts of this state and will be reserved for only the rarest of cases." 130 Some states explicitly disavow any joint custody presumption, legal or physical. 131 Other states' statutes are silent on the question, implying that the courts have wide discretion to craft a custodial arrangement in the best interest of the children. 132 In either circumstance, trial courts are called upon to apply a multi-factor test in making the "best-interest" custody decisions.
(A) INTRICACIES OF A JOINT DECISION-MAKING PRESUMPTION: THE NEW MEXICO EXAMPLE
Several states have a rebuttable statutory presumption that an allocation of decision-making responsibility to both parents jointly is in the best interest of the child. 133 The operation of the joint decision-making presumption is a complex process. By way of illustration, consider the New Mexico framework. Its statute mandates "a presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child in an initial custody determination."
134 But the statute carefully calibrates this presumption by subjecting it to a number of other provisions. A court considering joint custody is required first to weigh the regular statutory standards for the determination of child custody, and then to consider nine additional factors exclusive to joint custody. 135 The court is constrained not to "prefer one parent as a custodian solely because of gender."
136 If the court does order joint custody, it "may specify the circumstances, if any, under which the consent of both legal custodians is required to be obtained in order to exercise legal control of the child and the consequences of the failure to obtain mutual consent."
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The New Mexico statute also emphasizes the importance of parenting plans by providing that joint custody may not be ordered unless the court has approved a parenting plan beforehand. 138 The parenting plan must include "a division of a child's time and care into periods of responsibility for each parent." 139 The statute details five other provisions that may be included in the approved parenting plan:
1) statements regarding the child's religion, education, child care, recreational activities and medical and dental care; 2) designation of specific decision-making responsibilities; 3) methods of communicating information about the child, transporting the child, exchanging care for the child and maintaining telephone and mail contact between parent and child; 4) procedures for future decision-making, including procedures for dispute resolution; and 5) other statements regarding the welfare of the child or designed to clarify and facilitate parenting under joint custody arrangements.
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An award of joint custody does not imply an equal division of parenting time or financial responsibility for the child. 141 Each parent with joint custody is "expected to carry out [] responsibility for the child's financial, physical, emotional and developmental needs during that parent's periods of responsibility."
142 The parents' obligation to consult with one another before making a major child welfare decision is stated explicitly: "[N]either parent shall make a decision or take an action which results in a major change in a child's life until the matter has been discussed with the other parent and the parents agree."
143 Further detailed provisions spell out notification and other requirements regarding a parent's change of residence, the child's religious affiliation and activities, educational decisions and access to the child's school records, medical and dental providers, and the child's recreational activities. 144 The statutory scheme also provides seven options for making "decisions regarding major changes in a child's life." 145 These include mediation and family counseling requirements, allocating final decisional authority on a matter to one party, terminating joint custody, as well as a binding arbitration and court decision options.
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In sum, the joint custody presumption in New Mexico is far from straightforward or simple. It requires the trial court to engage in an intricate weighing of numerous statutorily required and fairly detailed factors. It also entails parental commitment to a well-articulated parenting plan for allocating the child's time and activities, as well as to very specific provisions for parental decision-making with regard to disputes or major changes to the child's life.
(B) CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH PRESUMPTIONS
A presumption is generally defined as "a legal inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact . . ." 147 What precise burden of proof is shifted by a presumption is a matter of some debate. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally." 148 But under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, a presumption "imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence." 149 In general, a rebuttable presumption is "[a]n inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence." 150 How would a joint custody presumption apply? It would likely require the party opposing joint custody to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption and thus shift the burden of persuasion to the party opposing joint custody. One commentator has suggested that "rather than treating both parents equally . . . a presumption would actually disfavor the parent opposing joint custody." 151 This is true, but tipping the scales toward shared parenting no matter which parent favors or opposes it is surely the legislative aim, provided it is in the child's best interests. Whether joint custody actually benefits children in most cases is, as yet unresolved. Unless carefully crafted, a joint custody presumption "would greatly minimize the custody factors that a court is required to consider and dilute or eliminate the best-interest-of-the-child standard."
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Some states have enacted a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the child if both parents request it. 153 This type of presumption belabors the obvious: parents generally decide what is in their children's welfare without state intervention. There is no policy reason why the act of separating or divorcing should result in abrogating parents' rights to raise their children. Judicial authority is needed only when parents cannot agree on child welfare issues. 154 Prudence in the light of experience should dictate, however, that given the hostility and overreaching that accompanies so many divorces, a court should retain the discretion to ensure that the parents' agreements have been reached voluntarily.
Joint custody presumptions that exceed parental agreement may be testing the limits of current social science research. Almost thirty years ago, Elizabeth Scott and Andre Derdeyn identified the two key assumptions of these more expansive joint custody presumptions, that parents will "be able to cooperate in raising their child, regardless of whether or not they freely decided upon joint custody," and that "the harm to the child caused by any interparental conflict will be outweighed by the benefit of continuing a parent-child relationship with both parents." 155 These assumptions continue to be "problematic."
156 Margaret F. Brinig has summarized the recent experiences of the states with joint custody presumptions:
Although strong presumptions of joint custody were popular in the 1980s when several states adopted them, the more recent practice, after some twenty years' experience, has been to allow joint custody as one of several options, rather than to presume that it is in the best interests of children. In other words, after experimentation with joint custody, some states have realized that continual moving between households may be harmful to children, that the bulk of newly divorced spouses cannot remain as positively involved with each other on an everyday basis as joint physical custody requires, or that the presumption is causing more litigation to already crowded dockets.
The effectiveness of these exceptions to custody presumptions has been challenged. Some commentators argue that the statutory framework is problematic because it "puts the burden of proving domestic violence on the victim of that violence." 163 Intimate partner abuse tends to be invisible and rarely reported, and despite the clear statutory mandate, courts often fail to fully account for domestic abuse. 164 At the same time, concerns have been raised about the extent of false allegations of domestic violence that can serve to corrupt the court's parenting determination process.
To promote active participation by both parents after separation, many states have amended their best interest factors to include "friendly parent" provisions. This assumption favors the parents more apt to encourage contact with the other parent. The rationale is straightforward: children are thought to do better when both parents continue to raise them; thus, if one parent will not allow the other to play that critical role and the other will, the "friendly parent" should have an advantage in the custody battle. 165 Some commentators have warned against using "friendly parent" provisions to trump evidence of domestic violence. 166 They warn of judicial rulings that "encourage cooperative parenting [even] in cases where increased contact may exacerbate conflict levels." 167 Some statutes attempt to address these concerns by declaring that the friendly parent provision does not apply in cases involving domestic violence.
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WHAT'S IN A NAME? THE NEW PARENTING PLAN NOMENCLATURE
Some states now reject the traditional terminology of child custody with its possessory overtones. 169 Legislatures, courts, and mental health professionals are in the process of exchanging the common law language for terms evocative of mutual parental involvement. Postseparation parenting responsibilities are increasingly addressed as decision-making and parenting time, and parents are often held responsible for drafting parenting plans to structure those decisions as they are reconstituting their families.
More than the lexicon is at stake. The aim is forthrightly a culture change, exemplified by the 2006 Australian law reforms which aimed to shift postseparation parenting from adversarial to collaborative. 170 A small but growing number of legislatures have jettisoned the traditional nomenclature, a development nudged along by the American Law Institute's issuance in 2002 of its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. The Principles embodied several key terminological changes, such as "allocation of custodial and decision-making responsibilities for children," and "parenting plan." 171 Ohio statutes, for example, describe a custody dispute as a "proceeding pertaining to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the care of a child," 172 and refer to joint custody as "shared parenting." 173 Minnesota has substituted a "parenting time" decision for the former decree allocating residential custody and visitation. 174 Similarly, divorcing Colorado parents now have a proceeding "concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities." 175 Physical custody in that state has been replaced by a "[d]etermination of parenting time," and legal custody is now the "[a]llocation of decision-making responsibility." 176 "Parenting time" describes the periods of time each parent spends with the child as outlined in a "parenting plan." These plans aim to achieve the public policy goal that children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents. These plans may be crafted from scratch by the parents, or they may be customized from a menu of sample plans available from court or private organization websites. They should be flexible but fairly detailed, setting out each parent's area of responsibility in providing for the child's residential and physical care as well as emotional well being, both at the time the plan goes into effect and as the child ages and matures. 177 Ideally, these plans should also recognize the likelihood of future parenting disputes by incorporating problem-solving mechanisms, such as mediation, collaborative law, parent coordination, and arbitration, with adjudication in court only as a last resort.
As the Washington Supreme Court noted, " [t] he key advantage of the parenting plan concept over the former law's custody concept is the parenting plan's ability to accommodate widely differing factual patterns and to allocate parental responsibility accordingly." 178 Development of a parenting plan is a significant family law mechanism created in response to the "persistent dissatisfaction with the traditional adversarial divorce process" and intended to encourage "models emphasizing selfdetermination and problem-solving approaches." 179 In the last generation, family courts have moved "towards a philosophy that supports collaborative, interdisciplinary, interest-based dispute resolution processes and limited use of traditional litigation." 180 In short, as Francis J. Catania, Jr. has argued, parenting plans aim "at reversing the trend toward the clean break as a social norm in child custody dispute resolution." 181 The separation of the parents from each other need not mean the parting of the parents from their children.
Many state statutes require a parenting plan as part of the process for obtaining joint custody. 182 Additionally, some state courts may require the parents to submit a plan to implement a joint custody order. 183 Some jurisdictions have also instituted parenting coordination programs "to provide a child-focused alternative dispute resolution process . . ." 184 The range and comprehensiveness of parenting plan provisions may be seen in the Arizona law requiring inclusion of the following:
1. A designation of the legal decision-making as joint or sole . . . 2. Each parent's rights and responsibilities for the personal care of the child and for decisions in areas such as education, health care and religious training. 3. A practical schedule of parenting time for the child, including holidays and school vacations. 4. A procedure for the exchanges of the child, including location and responsibility for transportation. 5. A procedure by which proposed changes, disputes and alleged breaches may be mediated or resolved, which may include the use of conciliation services or private counseling. 6. A procedure for periodic review of the plan's terms by the parents. 7. A procedure for communicating with each other about the child, including methods and frequency. 8. A statement that each party has read, understands and will abide by the notification requirements [pertaining to the sexual offenders registration law].
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Many state statutes contain similarly detailed provisions for parenting plans. 186 Parenting plans have become the preferred method to achieve the public policy goal that children have "frequent and continuing contact" with both parents, 187 and they are an integral component for millions of worldwide parenting resolutions.
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SHARED PARENTING PRESUMPTIONS, PREFERENCES, AND FACTORS: A SCHEMA OF CHOICES
The landscape for shared parenting is in legal and cultural transition. But it may be useful to view the blueprint for evolving legislation as having three sets of options on shared parenting: a legal presumption for shared parenting; a preference for shared parenting, and conditioning shared parenting upon the best interests of the child. What follows below is an effort to capture this moment in child custody law, drawing upon the leading edge of statutory development. After the core elements are described and defined, each set contains options relating to decision-making and parenting time. While this schema is annotated, no effort has been made to replicate a full statute.
I. Core Emerging Statutory Elements
A. Basic Principles Best Interest of the Child Standard: The child's best interest, including health, safety, and welfare, is the paramount consideration in a decision-making and parenting time determination. 189 Frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact with both parents is in the child's best interests in most circumstances. 190 The court shall ensure that the parenting plan agreed to by the parents is consistent with the child's best interests. In the event that the parents do not agree on a parenting plan, the court shall adopt a parenting plan that, consistent with the child's best interests, provides for both parents to share legal decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time.
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Abusive behavior: The "perpetration of child abuse or domestic violence in a household where the child resides is detrimental to the child." 192 Parental gender irrelevant: No preference shall be given to either parent because of that parent's gender. 193 Preference for Alternative Dispute Resolution: Litigation should be used as a last resort, after mediation and other dispute resolution methods have been seriously attempted. 194 
B. Definitions
Parenting Plan: A parenting plan allocates legal decision-making and parenting time.
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A parenting plan sets out the responsibility of each parent in providing for the child's care both at the time of implementation and as the child ages and matures. 196 A parenting plan must contain provisions for the resolution of future disputes between the parents, initially through non-adversarial dispute resolution methods. 197 Legal Decision-making: Legal decision-making (formerly known as legal custody) refers to the legal right and responsibility to make all nonemergency legal decisions for a child including those regarding welfare, education, health care, and religious training. Joint legal decision-making means that both parents share all parental rights, privileges, duties, powers, responsibilities, and obligations, except for specified decisions as set forth in the parenting plan. 198 Parenting Time: Parenting time (formerly known as physical custody) shall be allocated in the parenting plan in a manner to assure the child of frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents. Joint parenting time allocation means that the parents have significant periods of time during which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision of each of the parents. These periods of time are not necessarily equal, but must result in the child staying with each parent overnight for more than thirty percent of the year. 
CONCLUSION
Context is critical in assessing these statutory choices. Yet the ground of decision has never been more complex, with no consensus regarding how joint custody is defined, how it is awarded, or how precisely joint parenting time and decision-making interact. All insist that the child's best interest is of paramount concern, and all agree that children generally do best when both parents remain active in their lives. Yet, like Odysseus, our society and legal system must traverse the conflicts between twin dangers. Our Scylla, using the hard edge of legal presumptions to determine parental disputes, risks a mismatch between the paper statute and the flesh-and-blood family, and arguably increases litigation. Our Charybdis, rejecting presumptions and preferences to rely solely on case-by-case determinations, undermines predictability and also arguably increases litigation. As discussed in this Article, the most promising efforts may chart a third course: nudging separating and divorcing parents out of litigation and into a framework that both allows and encourages them to concentrate on mapping out a future with their children. Our culture is moving in the direction of increasingly shared parenting. The legal system needs to do its best to facilitate that process. 3. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452 (observing that the father maintained ultimate authority over his children in Roman law). of a child to the mother because "the law of nature has given to her an attachment for her infant offspring which no other relative will be likely to possess in an equal degree"); Fritz v. Fritz, 148 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Iowa 1967) (noting that the tender years presumption is based on "the premise that the fundamental attributes of gentleness, moral stability, honesty, and a sense of value in the field of education, ambition, and achievement are somehow stronger and more pronounced in mothers than in fathers").
8. 130-131 (1994) (noting that the primary caretaker presumption penalizes men for being the principal wage earner during the marriage and ignores "the most important emotional and interactive behaviors promoting children's development and psychological, social, and academic adjustment, such as love, acceptance, respect, encouragement of autonomy, learning, and self-esteem, moral guidance, and absence of abusive interactions . . ."); see also Rebecca E. Hatch and Leann Michael, Gender Bias as Factor in Child Custody Cases, 131 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 457, § 1 (2013) (observing that "where a Mother is the one to provide for the child's care and the Father takes on the career role, a judge may be inclined to maintain this relationship in order to keep the environment stable for the child").
16. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West) ("The primary caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the best interests of the child."); Arthur v. Arthur, 2013 WL 2150858 (Ga. 2013 ) (holding that the trial court's finding that mother had been the children's primary caretaker was sufficient to support its award of primary physical custody to her); Gordon v. Richards, 959 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (N.Y. App. 2013) (upholding the trial court's award of primary physical custody to the mother on finding that she had been the primary caretaker for most of the child's life and was best able to provide stability for the child); Evans v. Evans, 610 S.E.2d 264, 267 (N.C. 2005) (affirming court's order giving father primary residence in part because he "has been a primary source of care and tuition for the minor children since their birth."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (listing "the child's primary caretaker" as a relevant factor in ascertaining the best interests of the child 27. Taylor v. Taylor, supra, 508 A.2d at 970. See id. at 971 ("Rarely, if ever, should joint legal custody be awarded in the absence of a record of mature conduct on the part of the parents evidencing an ability to effectively communicate with each other concerning the best interest of the child, and then only when it is possible to make a finding of a strong potential for such conduct in the future.").
28 Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d 671, 675 (New Mex. App. 1986 ) (noting that the child custody statute "does not mandate that the court give greater or lesser weight to any specific factor. That is a matter reserved to the trial court's discretion. It is the trial judge who hears all the evidence, who observes the demeanor of the parties and their witnesses and who is in the best position to exercise his sound judgment.").
40. See, e.g., Benal v. Benal, 22 So.2d 369, 372-377 (Ms. App. 2009 ) (identifying and discussing the 11 factors set out by the state supreme court in Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003 (Ms. 1983 ).
41. The Texas statute reflects a common theme in declaring that the "public policy of this state" consists of "assur[ing] that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child; [] provid[ing] a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and [] encourag [ing] parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001 (West) . In Canada, the Divorce Act provides both that the court must consider "only the best interests of the child," but that in doing so the court must adhere to "the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child. . . ." Divorce Act [Canada], R.S.C., 1985, c.3 See Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1978 Fonder v. Fonder, 823 N.W.2d 504 (N.D. 2012); and Murphy v. Murphy, 714 A.2d 576 (R.I. 1998 § 9-13-101(a) ) (emphasis omitted). The new legislation also provided that "custody shall be awarded in such a way so as to assure the frequent and continuing contact of the child with both parents" consistent with the child's best interest, including the provision favoring an award of joint custody. cf. id., (providing that joint custody is presumed to be in the best interests of the child if the parents both request it); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West) (directing the court to "consider granting joint custody in cases where the parents do not agree to joint custody" on the application "of either parent").
57. Fountain v. Waguespack, 639 So.2d 882, 887 (La. App. 1994 ) (characterizing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132). 58. See, e.g., Elrod & Dale, supra note 2, at 399 (noting that when joint custody was ordered over one party's objection, "the rate of relitigation is roughly the same as when a parent has sole custody").
59. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 529 N.W.2d 724, 726 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995 ). 60. Meyer v. Anderson, 2002 WL 1251449 (Ohio App. 2002 .1 ("In any custody dispute between parents, the court may order joint legal custody so that both parents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their child and so that both parents must confer on, and participate in, major decisions affecting the welfare of the child.").
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2B. 63. Peterson v. Swarthout, 214 P.3d 332, 336n.6 (Alaska 2009 Id. § 19-9-3(d). 68. Willis v. Willis, 707 S.E.2d 344, 347 (Ga. 2011) . 69. HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(a)(1) (West); see also IND. CODE § 31-17-2-13 ("The court may award legal custody of a child jointly if the court finds that an award of joint legal custody would be in the best interest of the child."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (5) ("The court may grant joint custody to the child's parents . . . if it is in the best interest of the child."). In the case of Marriage of Gerchak, 2007 WL 5471744 (Ariz. App. 2007 , the appellate court explicitly rejected a party's assertion that there was "an unstated presumption in the judicial system" that joint custody is preferred. Id. at *3. The court affirmed that Arizona law called upon the court to determine the appropriate custodial arrangement exclusively upon the best interests of the child. Id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403.The Maryland Court of Appeals carefully articulated its rationale for refusing to adopt any custody preferences:Formula or computer solutions in child custody matters are impossible because of the unique character of each case, and the subjective nature of the evaluations and decisions that must be made. At best we can discuss the major factors that should be considered in determining whether joint custody is appropriate, but in doing so we recognize that none has talismanic qualities, and that no single list of criteria will satisfy the demands of every case . . . We emphasize that in any child custody case, the paramount concern is the best interest of the child. Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 970 (Md. 1986 Id., . The court need not comply with this directive if after a hearing it finds "that parenting time would endanger the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health. " Id. 74. Word v. Remick, 58 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Ark. App. 2001 ) ("Joint custody or equally divided custody of minor children is not favored in Arkansas unless circumstances clearly warrant such action.").
75. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 665(a) ("When the parents cannot agree to divide or share parental rights and responsibilities, the court shall award parental rights and responsibilities primarily or solely to one parent."; Cabot v. Cabot, 697 A.2d 644, 649 (Vt. 1997) ("The meaning of § 665(a) is plain: where the parents cannot agree, the court must award primary (or sole) parental rights and responsibilities to one parent.").
76. In re Marriage of Dobey, 258 Ill. App.3d 874, 876 (1994) . Maryland's highest court has also emphasized the need for evidence of both present harmonious contact between the parents and a basis for believing the pattern has been set for further cooperation: "Rarely, if ever, should joint legal custody be awarded in the absence of a record of mature conduct on the part of the parents evidencing an ability to effectively communicate with each other concerning the best interest of the child, and then only when it is possible to make a finding of a strong potential for such conduct in the future." Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 971 (Md. 1986 See Bell v. Bell, 794 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1990 ) ("While actual physical custody may not be practical or appropriate in all cases, it is the intent of the legislature that both parents have the opportunity to guide and nurture their child and to meet the needs of the child on an equal footing beyond the considerations of support or actual custody.") (quoting An Act Relating to Child Custody, ch. 88 § 1(a), SLA 1982). The actual prevalence of joint physical custody is hard to estimate. Two decades ago, a California study found joint legal custody (79% of cases) much more common that joint physical custody (19.6% of cases). Significantly, the study also found that a substantial shift took place in many joint physical custody cases. Within three years of the court order, 45% of the joint physical custody arrangements had ; see also N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:2-4 (declaring "the public policy of this State to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and that it is in the public interest to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy").
89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(a). Wisconsin has a similar statute which call for the court to "set a placement schedule that allows the child to have regularly occurring, meaningful periods of physical placement with each parent and that maximizes the amount of time the child may spend with each parent, taking into account geographic separation and accommodations for different households." WIS. STAT. § 767.41 (4) (4); see also D.C. CODE § 16-914 (providing "a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child . . ." but apparently subsuming it under the authority of the court to "issue an order that provides for frequent and continuing contact between each parent and the minor child or children and for the sharing of responsibilities of child-rearing and encouraging the love, affection, and contact between the minor child or children and the parents"). Id. In Idaho, as in some other states with a joint custody presumption, a court awarding sole custody must make specific findings describing why joint custody is inappropriate. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B; see Roeh v. Roeh, 746 P.2d 1016 , 1020 (Ida. App. 1987 ) (noting that "if a court determines to award either physical or legal custody solely to one parent, the court is required to state in its decision the reasons why the award is not for joint custody."). In that case, the appellate court stressed the importance of a high level of specificity; merely alluding to one party's unfitness or including facts that only implied the court's reasoning was held insufficient to overcome the presumption. Roeh v. Roeh, supra, 746 P.2d at 1018-21.
116. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3002, 3020 (West). Joint legal custody is defined conventionally, with both parents sharing "the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child. " Id., § 3003. 117. Id., § 3080. The presumption is also subject to the statute detailing the best interest considerations. See § § 3011, 3080. 118. Id., § 3004. This provision is also subject to the best interest statute (Id., § 3011).
119. In almost identical terms, the Florida Legislature pronounced "the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West). Accordingly, courts are directed to "order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." Id. But there is no presumption "for or against any specific time-sharing schedule when creating or modifying the parenting plan of the child." Id.
120. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-152(c) ("If both parents request joint custody, the presumption is that joint custody is in the best interest of the child."); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1993) ("There is a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child . . . where the parents have agreed to joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56a(b) ("There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(D) ("In any case in which the parents agree to a form of custody, the court should award custody consistent with the agreement unless the court determines that such agreement is not in the best interests of the child.") The New Hampshire custody statute contains a presumption "that joint decision-making responsibility is in the best interest of minor children" which may be triggered either by mutual agreement or by the request of "either parent." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:5(I-II). In the latter case, joint custody may be awarded in the court's discretion, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to assist in this determination. In either case, should the court refuse to order joint custody it "shall state in its decision the reasons for the denial." Id.
121. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(A)(i ("[T] he court may make by decree or order any disposition of the children that appears most expedient and in the best interests of the children."); id., § 20-2-201(d) "Custody shall be crafted to promote the best interests of the children, and may include any combination of joint, shared or sole custody."
133. These include Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, D.C., Wisconsin, and Utah. For example, the Idaho statute provides that "absent a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, there shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child or children." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(4). The Florida statute similarly provides that the court "shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (2009). A recent Florida appellate case has held, however, that even with this statutory presumption and with a signed parental agreement, a trial court should have conducted its own best interests analysis prior to entry of a joint custody order. Sparks v. Sparks, 75 So.3d 861 (Fla. App. 2011) . Note that a parent's domestic violence offense or history of domestic violence will frequently serve to rebut the presumption. Jurisdictions with these provisions include Idaho, Texas, Utah, Washington, D.C., West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The Idaho statute contains a presumption "that joint custody is not in the best interests of a minor child if one (1) of the parents is found by the court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B (5) .
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A). 135. Id., § 40-4-9.1(B). 136. Id., § 40-4-9.1(C). 137. Id., § 40-4-9.1(E). 138. Id., § 40-4-9.1(F). 139. Id. 140. Id. 141. Id., .1(J)(1); 40-4-9.1(L)(4). 142. Id., § 40-4-9.1(J)(2). 143. Id., § 40-4-9.1(J)(3).
